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BOERNE AND BUDDHISM':
RECONSIDERING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AFTER
BOERNE v. FLORES

ERIC PRUITT*

INTRODUCTION
The Yang family, ethnic Hmong immigrants from Laos, was
horrified when they learned what the State of Rhode Island had
done to their son. The Yang's son died from a seizure while
sleeping.! In the Yang's native Laos, no one would think to
desecrate the body of the dead by mutilating it.' Unfortunately for
the Yang family, the State of Rhode Island's medical examiner
never considered that a routine autopsy would violate someone's
religious beliefs.! The judge described the emotionally charged
courtroom when he awarded the Yang family damages for the
violation of their First Amendment Free Exercise rights:5 "I was
moved by their tearful outburst in the courtroom during the
hearing on damages. I have seldom, in twenty-four years on the
bench, seen such a sincere instance of emotion displayed."6
Relying on what he believed to be settled free exercise
jurisprudence, the judge found that the autopsy on the Yang's son

* J.D. Candidate, June 2001.
1. Despite the title, this Comment does not limit itself to an examination
of the practice of Buddhism in America under the Court's holding in Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Rather, the Comment addresses the implications
of the Boerne decision for members of non-Christian, minority religions in
general.
2. Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845, 846 (1990).
3. Id.
4. According to the Hmong religion, the Yangs believed that the
mutilation of their son's body meant that his spirit would not be free, and
would be forced to come back and take another person in the family. Yang v.
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof").
6. Yang, 750 F. Supp. at 558.
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violated their right to the free exercise of religion.7 But, as the
court was researching damages for the case, the Supreme Court
turned free exercise jurisprudence on its head with its decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.' The court was forced to reverse
its previous judgment and find that there had been no violation of
the Yang's constitutional rights.9
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court
eliminated the compelling interest test ° from free exercise
jurisprudence." The Supreme Court effectively eliminated the
established constitutional right to religion-based exemptions from
generally applicable laws." Previously, the compelling interest
test, developed in Sherbert v. Verner"3 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,"'
allowed members of religious minorities to receive judicial
exemptions from facially-neutral, generally applicable civil and
criminal laws that had placed a burden on the free exercise of
their religion.' 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that
the compelling interest test would instigate social anarchy. 6
7. Yang, 728 F. Supp. at 857.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Yang, 750 F. Supp. at 560.
10. See infra note 15 (describing the compelling governmental interest test).
11. See 494 U.S. at 890 (holding that Oregon is not constitutionally
compelled to exempt the sacramental use of peyote by members of a Native
American church from the generally applicable state law prohibiting peyote
possession).

12. Id.
13. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that South Carolina could not deny
unemployment compensation to a Seventh-day Adventist for refusing to work
on her Sabbath).
14. 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin may not compel Amish
children to attend public schools past the age of 14 when such attendance
would violate the religious belief and practice of the Amish).
15. Under the compelling interest test developed in Sherbert and Yoder, a
plaintiff must first show that a state law or regulation has substantially
burdened a sincere religious belief. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. Once the plaintiff
has proven the burden on religious beliefs, the burden shifts to the state to
demonstrate a compelling interest in enforcing the law against the claimant.
Id. The state must also show that the means selected are necessary for
protecting that interest. Id.
16. Justice Scalia writes "[a]ny society adopting such a system of
constitutionally compelled religious exemptions would be courting anarchy"
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. This argument ignores the
obvious fact that courts had been using the Sherbert test to grant exemptions
for 27 years without any resulting anarchy. See David E. Steinberg, Rejecting
the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 241, 320 n.21 (1995) (stating that the threshold requirements for
religious exemptions and the compelling state interest element of the Sherbert
test were sufficient to prevent abuse of exemptions by those people interested
only in circumventing the law). But see William P. Marshall, The Case
Against the ConstitutionallyCompelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 357, 358-70 (1990) (arguing against free exercise exemptions to
facially-neutral laws of general applicability).
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Justice Scalia founded his decision on the belief that denial of free
exercise rights to religious minorities is an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government." 7 Boerne v. Flores most
recently restated and buttressed the Court's rejection of religiousbased exemptions to facially neutral laws of general applicability."
This Comment proposes that the Supreme Court reinstate the
compelling interest test of Sherbert as applied to Free Exercise
Clause challenges to facially-neutral laws of general applicability.
Part I discusses the historical development of free exercise
jurisprudence and the development of religion-based exemptions
from laws of general applicability. Part II explores the current
state of religious pluralism in the United States, and establishes
the need for religion-based exemptions. Part II then examines
three cases decided under Boerne and Employment Division v.

Smith to show how members of religious minorities were denied
basic free exercise rights under the Employment Division v. Smith

rule. Part II examines cases decided under the Sherbert test to see
how the compelling interest test vindicated the rights of religious
minorities. Part III, in the context of the discussed case law,
critiques the reasoning used by Justice Scalia in Employment
Division v. Smith to justify the abolition of free exercise
exemptions.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE EMERGENCE OF EXEMPTIONS

9

Free exercise jurisprudence has always been settled in two

17. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
18. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). RFRA explicitly
sought to overturn the Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith and to
reinstate the compelling interest test established in Sherbert and Yoder. Id.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-32 (1993) (holding that a law which is generally applicable, but not
neutral, must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and must be

narrowly tailored to advance that interest if it burdens religious practice).
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye Court held that protections of the Free
Exercise Clause only apply if the law at issue discriminates against some
religious belief, or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for
religious reasons. Id. at 532. See generally Rachel Toker, Tying the Hands of
Congress: City of Boerne v. Flores 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 273, 273 (1997).
19. This Section deals only with the emergence of free exercise exemptions
as granted by the courts in interpreting the Constitution. This Section will
not address the development of statutory exemptions granted by state
legislatures to religious minorities. Justice Scalia prefers leaving free exercise
exemptions to state legislatures. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
at 890 (stating that the legislatures are better suited than judges to protect
the free exercise of religion).
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areas: attempts to suppress religious expression have been
countered by the Free Speech Clause, and laws that intentionally
and explicitly discriminate against religious individuals have been
struck down under both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.2 0 Cases in which a facially-neutral law of general
applicability burdens non-expressive religious conduct 2 ' have
provided the most difficulty for the courts.2
A. Mormon Challenges Under the Free Exercise Clause
The first major free exercise challenges to laws of general
applicability came from Mormons challenging anti-polygamy
laws.22 In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court stated
that religious beliefs could never be accepted as a justification for
an act that violates a criminal or civil law of general applicability.'
The Court emphasized that the concept of free exercise of religion
does not actually extend to protect religiously motivated action. 5
This interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause would remain
intact for the next eighty-five years.

20. See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 246-47 (reviewing established Free
Exercise doctrines); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520-21
(holding that a law prohibiting "unnecessary slaughter of animals"
discriminated prohibited free exercise of religion of church practicing animal
sacrifice); United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 876 (1979) (holding
that religious practice of "Hare Krishnas" in soliciting donations from
strangers was constitutionally protected religious expression).
21. Non-expressive religious conduct includes challenges to Sunday closing
laws, mandatory public education and zoning laws. Steinberg, supra note 16,
at 247.
22. Id.
23. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (upholding the
conviction of a Mormon for the crime of polygamy); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15, 47 (1885) (upholding an act of Congress excluding polygamists from
voting or holding office); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890) (upholding
the requirement that voters take an oath that they are not members of an
organization that teaches polygamy). See generally Orma Linford, The
Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 308 (1964)
(detailing the legal history of the Mormon challenges to polygamy laws);
EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN ANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY-SAINTS,

1830-1900, at 129-209 (1988) (describing the Mormon challenges to polygamy
laws in the 19th century).
24. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146 (involving a Mormon defendant challenging
the constitutionality of the federal law prohibiting bigamy in the territory of
Utah).
25. See id. at 166 (stating that "laws are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices").
26. Eighty-five years after Reynolds, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held
that Mrs. Sherbert's religious practice of observing Sabbath on Saturdays and
not working then was protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
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B. Reinterpretingthe Free Exercise Clause
and the Emergence of Exemptions
It was not until the case of Sherbert v. Verner that the
Supreme Court took notice of the fact that the term "free exercise"
contains some connotation of freedom of action.27 In Sherbert, the
Court held that South Carolina's denial of unemployment benefits
to the appellant because of her religiously motivated refusal to
work on Saturdays was a violation of her First Amendment right
to free exercise of her religion. 8 In finding for Mrs. Sherbert, the
Court for the first time recognized that freedom of action is an
essential part of the constitutional guarantee of the Free Exercise
Clause. 9 The Court introduced a new rule that required the
government to demonstrate a compelling interest when it sought
to enforce a facially neutral law of general applicability that
conflicted with a claimant's religious beliefs. °
Although the Sherbert test finally allowed claimants to seek
free exercise exemptions from nondiscriminatory, generally
applicable laws, most claimants were not able to overcome the

27. Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free
Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 312-20 (1981). See also Michael W.

McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488 (1990) (stating that the term "free
exercise" makes clear that the clause protects religiously motivated conduct as
well as belief). McConnell notes that the framers of the Constitution had
rejected the term "rights of conscience" in favor of the phrase "free exercise."
Id. at 1489-90. According to McConnell, one dictionary at use at the time of
the Constitutional Convention defined exercise as an "[aict of divine worship,
whether public or private." Id. at 1489.
28. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). Mrs. Sherbert was a
member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Id. at 399. Her employer fired
Mrs. Sherbert because Saturday is the Sabbath day in her faith, and she
refused to work on that day. Id. Unable to find other employment, she was
denied unemployment benefits because the state found that she "fail[ed],
without good cause, to accept suitable work." Id. at 401.
29. The Court has consistently applied the Sherbert rule in unemployment
benefits cases to protect religiously motivated conduct. See Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Indian Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 707 (1981) (finding that a
person could not be disqualified from unemployment benefits for the sole
reason that he had left his employment on the basis of sincerely held religious
beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 136 (1987)
(holding that a six-day a week job availability requirement had to be waived
for a person who was prohibited from working on Saturday by their religious
beliefs).
30. Before granting a religion based exemption from a generally applicable
law under Sherbert, a court must first consider whether there is a compelling
state interest in enforcing the law against the religious claimant so as to
justify the substantial infringement of his First Amendment right. Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 406. Even if the State shows a compelling interest in enforcing the
law, it must also show that prohibiting the religiously motivated conduct is the
least restrictive means of protecting that interest. Id. at 407.
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compelling government interest element of the Sherbert test.3"
However, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional right to religionbased exemptions from generally applicable laws in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.32
In Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment prevented Wisconsin from compelling Amish
parents to force their children to attend school through age
sixteen.33 Having established the sincerity of the Amish claimant's
beliefs and the centrality of home education after the age of
fourteen to maintaining their religion, the Yoder Court then
applied the "balancing of interests test" established in Sherbert,
and found that the State of Wisconsin did not have a compelling
interest in denying the Amish families an exemption from the
Yoder presents a forceful
state's compulsory education law.'
The Yoder opinion
renunciation of the Reynolds doctrine. 5
31. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982) (holding that an
Amish employer could not have an exemption from payment of Social Security
taxes on the ground that his Amish beliefs prohibited participation in
governmental support programs); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 440
(1971) (refusing to grant an exemption to the draft for general opposition to
the war in Vietnam).
32. 406 U.S. 205, 212. The Yoder Court also recognized that before
subjecting the law or regulation to the strict scrutiny standard, a threshold
determination as to the sincerity of the claimant's belief and the centrality of
the prohibited act in the claimant's religion must be made. Id. at 235-36. See
generally Steinberg, supra note 16, at 276-96 (examining the criticisms made
against the propriety of such a threshold inquiry and proposing that the
sincerity and centrality inquiries have been used effectively by the courts in
preventing excessive or improper free exercise claims from being made).
33. The Amish parents in this case wished to withdraw their children from
public school at age 14. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209. The parents believed that
allowing them to attend school after this age would endanger their and their
children's salvation. Id. The parents argued that high school education for the
children would erode the Amish belief system and take the children away from
the community at a formative stage in their lives. Id. at 211.
34. Id. Here, the court found that the State's interest in compulsory
education to the age of 16 was not sufficient to override an Amish interest in
protecting the integrity of their unique religious community. Id. The Amish
parents introduced compelling evidence that accommodating their religious
beliefs by foregoing one or two years of compulsory education would not impair
the physical or mental health of the child, neither would it result in an
inability of the children to be self-supporting, or in anyway to detract from the
welfare of society. Id. at 227-29. Cf Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
175 (1944) (holding that a family could not be exempted from child labor laws
for having their children distribute religious literature).
35. Id. at 220. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
[t]o agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the
broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of
conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under
regulations of general applicability.
Id. at 220. The State of Wisconsin, citing several previous Supreme Court and
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acknowledges the possible dangers involved in providing religious
individuals with exemptions from the general obligations of
citizenship.36 However, the Yoder opinion states that the threshold
inquiries into sincerity and centrality of belief, combined with the
weighing of state and individual interests provides a reasonable
way of preserving both the Free Exercise Clause and the state's
police power."
C. Employment Division v. Smith, The Religious Freedom
RestorationAct of 1993, and Boerne: The Battle over Free Exercise
Exemptions
For twenty years following the decision in Yoder, courts
continued to apply the Sherbert balancing test,' even though no
such claims for free exercise exemptions were successful in the
Supreme Court following Yoder.39 In 1990, the Supreme Court's
state court cases grounded in the Reynolds holding, conceded that religious
beliefs are free from the state's control, but argued that all actions, even those
motivated by religion, are outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. Id. at 219. See, e.g., State v. Garber, 419 P.2d 896, 902
(1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967) (holding that compulsory school
attendance is within the valid police power of the state and does not violate
the religious freedom of Amish plaintiffs); State v. Hershberger, 144 N.E.2d
693, 693 (1955) (holding that Amish must comply with compulsory public
education laws); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 79 A.2d 134, 134 (1951) (holding
that Amish must comply with laws requiring education of children to the age
of sixteen).
36. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
37. Chief Justice Burger acknowledges in the majority opinion that he
would have decided this case very differently if the state had shown that the
religiously motivated conduct it sought to regulate posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace, or order. Id. at 230. Justice Stewart reiterated
in his concurring opinion that the analysis under the Sherbert test would have
yielded a different result in this case if there had been any showing that the
Amish practice of educating children at home after the age of 14 posed a
substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. Id. at 240.
38. See e.g., Islamic Center of Mississippi v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d
293, 303 (5th Cir. 1988) (using the Sherbert balancing test, the court held that
the city of Starkville had without compelling interest substantially burdened
claimant's free exercise rights when denying a commonly granted zoning
variance to an Islamic worship center); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that prohibiting members of
a religious group from approaching people for the purpose of soliciting
donations violated their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
when the conduct was religiously motivated and the state failed to
demonstrate any less intrusive means of regulation); United States v.
Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D. Fla. 1979) (holding that members of
religious sect were exempt from a law prohibiting solicitation on federal
property upon demonstrating that such conduct was sincere and religiously
motivated).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) (holding that an
Amish employer could not claim a free exercise exemption from his obligation
to pay Social Security taxes). The compelling government interest in
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decision in Employment Division v. Smith0 marked a dramatic

reversal in the Court's previous commitment to the Sherbert test
and the principle of constitutionally compelled free exercise
exemptions.4 The two claimants in the case ingested peyote as
part of a Native American religious ceremony, and, as a result,
were subsequently fired from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation
center.4' The State of Oregon refused to grant unemployment
benefits to the claimants, because they ingested peyote in violation
of Oregon law.4' The Supreme Court held that the State was not
constitutionally compelled to exempt Smith and Galen from
application of Oregon's peyote law." But rather than decide the
case under the established Sherbet test,4' the Court harshly
renounced the very idea of religion-based exemptions to neutral
laws of general applicability. 46 Both Justice O'Connor and Justice
collecting taxes and preserving the Social Security fund were found to
outweigh the claimant's religious objections. Id. at 260. See also Tony &

Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293 (1985) (holding
that religious employees could not be exempted from the minimum wage and

record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (refusing to grant an exemption for an
Orthodox Jewish soldier from an Air Force regulation prohibiting him from
wearing his yarmulke while on duty).
40. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
41. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun states his belief that Employment
Division v. Smith "effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law
concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution," which is based on the
dangerous assumption that "repression of minority religions is an unavoidable
consequence of democratic government." Id. at 908-09.
42. Id. at 874.
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1993).
44. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
45. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, points out that the same
result in the case could have been reached by applying the Sherbert test as the
Court had done for nearly 30 years. Id. at 903.
46. Id. at 888-90. Justice Scalia reverts to the Reynolds doctrine, that
while government may not interfere with religious beliefs, it may interfere
with religiously motivated action. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 152
(1879). Scalia bases the Court's new refusal to grant free exercise exemptions
on the premise that social anarchy will result. Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. at 888. Justice Scalia cites cases in which claimants sought free
exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws against child neglect,
compulsory military service, payment of taxes, compulsory vaccination,
minimum wage laws, and environmental protection. Id. at 889. But, as
Justice O'Connor points out, in all the examples Justice Scalia cites in his
"social chaos" argument, the courts utilized the Sherbet test to find that the
government had a compelling interest that outweighed the burden placed on
the religious claimant. Id. at 902. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (holding that a religious objector was not exempt from compulsory
military service); Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(holding that a religious objector was not exempt from mandatory vaccination
laws); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that
there is no Free Exercise Clause exemption from laws against religious
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Blackmun vigorously argued against this sudden reversal of
established First Amendment jurisprudence.47 Additionally, the
Employment Division v. Smith decision triggered protest from
academics, religious groups, and lawmakers. 4
In response to these criticisms of the Employment Division v.
Smith holding, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).4 9 Congress enacted RFRA using
discrimination).
47. Justice Blackmun, in the Employment Division v. Smith decision,

referred to the decision as a "wholesale overturning of settled law concerning
the Religion Clauses." 494 U.S. at 908. In defense of the Sherbert test, Justice
O'Connor wrote: "The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's
mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a
pluralistic society. For the Court to deem this command a luxury is to
denigrate the very purpose of the Bill of Rights". Id. at 903.
48. See generally John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the
Free Exercise Clause: A Critiqueof Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991)
(arguing against the proposition that exemptions to laws of general
applicability will produce social chaos); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991)
(examining the history of free exercise exemptions in Constitutional
discourse); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious
Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841 (1992) (describing several court cases
which point out the need for free exercise exemptions). As David E. Steinberg
notes, even commentators who support the Court's holding in Employment
Division v. Smith are critical of the reasoning used by the Court. Steinberg,
supra note 16, at 320 n.45. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 308, 308-09 (1991) (stating
that the Employment Division v. Smith decision "exhibits only a shallow
understanding of free exercise jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders
on fiction").
49. 5 U.S.C. § 504; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1994). RFRA
reads as follows:
§ 2000bb-1 Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a
judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section
shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of
the Constitution.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 bb-1 (1993).
See generally Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221 (1993) (stating that Congress' enforcement power
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its enforcement -authority under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment." RFRA was unusual legislation because it explicitly
stated its intention to overrule the Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.5 1
Congress' restoration of the Sherbert/Yoder test was shortlived. The Court responded to Congress with its 1997 ruling in
Boerne v. Flores.5
The Court, in declaring RFRA an
unconstitutional exercise of section five enforcement power under
the Fourteenth Amendment, reiterated its holding in Employment
Division v. Smith, and eliminated the right to free exercise
exemptions from laws of general applicability.u
Although Congress is currently contemplating new legislation
modeled after RFRA, there is currently no constitutional means by
which religious minorities may challenge burdens placed on the
free exercise of their religion by laws of general applicability.
The next section explores the current state of religious diversity in
the United States and examines why a free exercise exemption is
required to protect the First Amendment rights of members of
non-Christian religious traditions.

under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the power to enforce the Free
Exercise Clause).
50. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the united States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws .... Section 5: The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
51. The Act's stated purposes were: (1) to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guarantee the test's application in all cases
where the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide
a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994).
52. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The case was brought by a church seeking an
exemption to local zoning laws under RFRA. Id. at 507.
53. 521 U.S. at 536. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared
that Congress' § 5 enforcement power is remedial and not substantive in
nature. Id. at 524-36. Unlike civil rights legislation enacted under § 5 and
upheld as constitutional by the Court, the majority felt that in this instance
there was no showing of a "free exercise problem" in the United States. Id. at
530-36. But see Rachel Toker, Tying the Hands of Congress: City of Boerne v.
Flores 117 S.Ct. 2157, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 309-11 (1997) (arguing
that minority religious groups do need protection from assimilative pressures).
54. H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); S.2148, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); H.
REP. No. 106-219 at 13 (1999). The new act, known as the Religious Liberty
Protection Act [hereinafter RLPAI, is modeled closely after RFRA. Id. Unlike
RFRA, RLPA is grounded in Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. H.
REP. No. 106-219 at 13 (1999).
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THE REALITIES OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE NEED

FOR FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS

Justice Kennedy justifies the nullification of free exercise
exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith and Boerne by
claiming that laws of general applicability very rarely burden the
free exercise of religion in America.55 By nullifying free exercise
exemptions, the Employment Division v. Smith decision leaves the
political process at the state level as the sole protector of minority
groups' free exercise rights.56
This section explores the fallacy in both the assumption that
laws of general applicability rarely burden sincere religious
practice and the belief that the political process is sufficient to
protect a freedom guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Part A
examines the history of the cultural and religious assumptions
underlying Scalia's reasoning in Employment Division v. Smith.
Part B focuses on specific cases decided under Employment
Division v. Smith and Boerne where members of Asian religions
were denied their constitutionally guaranteed right to free exercise
of religion by generally applicable laws. These cases offer
important examples of how the majority often fails to recognize
certain conduct as "religious" in enacting laws of general
applicability. Part C examines specific cases decided under the
SherbertlYoder test to show how judicially administered free
exercise exemptions are an essential and effective means of
protecting the free exercise rights of Asian-Americans and other
minority groups.
A. Religious Homogeneity and Laws of GeneralApplicability
The America of the 18th and 19th centuries was marked by a
high degree of religious homogeneity.57 Although there was a
diverse number of Protestant Christian sects in early America, the
55. But see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 540 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
several striking instances of burdens placed on the free exercise rights of
minority groups by facially-neutral laws of general applicability); Craig
Anthony Arnold, Religious Freedom as a Civil Rights Struggle, 2 FALL NEXUS
J. OPINION 149, 154 (1997) (stating that the growth of the regulatory state has
increased the instances where laws of general applicability unintentionally

place substantial burdens on the free exercise rights of religious minorities).
56. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Justice Scalia
states that "[vialues that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the
political process." Id. Accommodation of religious minorities is to be left to
the political process. Id. Justice Scalia goes a step further by declaring that
the resulting loss of free exercise rights by religious minorities is merely an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government." Id. It seems obvious
that this "unavoidable consequence" was exactly what the Framers intended
to prevent by placing the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment.
57. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA 25-30 (1990).
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citizens and lawmakers of 18th and 19th century America shared
a Judeo-Christian worldview with all of its cultural and moral
assumptions.'
As is still the case today, laws of general
applicability inevitably reflected and supported these values.59
Jews challenging Sunday closing laws or Mormons fighting antipolygamy laws were denied free exercise rights because the
religion of the majority had directly shaped the criminal or civil
law.60 With the relative homogeneity of America in this period,
free exercise challenges to laws of general applicability were
relatively few. 61
America is now a vastly different place.62 Liberalization of
58. Id. at 25-70. See generally MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN
LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 227-70 (Little, Brown & Co. 1985)

(describing how Protestant America tried to suppress Native American,
African-American, and other minority beliefs and practices in the 19th
century).
59. Justice Field's comments in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)
indicate how mainstream Christian values are often integrated into the law to
the detriment of religious minorities. In the prosecution of a Mormon for
violation of bigamy laws, Justice Field defined religion as "having reference to
one's views of his relations to his Creator." Id. As a Protestant Christian,
Justice Field conceived of religion as a belief system to the exclusion of other
elements of religion such as processions, rituals, images, and statues that form
a large part of religious life for Catholics and members of non-Christian
traditions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism. Id.
Justice Field's justification for the denial of the Mormon's free exercise
challenge to the polygamy law violates the very essence of the First
Amendment. He expressly justifies the suppression of the Mormon religious
practice of polygamy through a direct reference to "Christian values." Id. He
writes:
[pirobably never before in the history of this country has it been
seriously contended that the whole punitive power of the government for
acts, recognized by the general consent of the Christian world in modern
times as proper matters for prohibitory legislation[emphasis added],
must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious sect
encouraging crime may be carried out without hindrance.
Id. at 343. Although such a statement would be surprising from a Supreme
Court justice today, the degree to which Christian values permeate laws of
general applicability persists.
60. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878) (holding that
Mormons could not challenge anti-polygamy laws claiming a right to free
exercise of religion under the First Amendment); Braunfield v. Braun, 366
U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (holding that Orthodox Jewish merchants could not be
exempted from a state law mandating businesses to close on Sunday).
Amazingly, the Court found that the Sunday closing law does not violate the
Establishment Clause, but merely furthers the state interest in providing a
uniform day of rest for workers. Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 605.
61. Such challenges were limited to Mormon challenges of anti-polygamy
laws, Jewish and Seventh-Day Adventist challenges to Sunday Sabbath laws,
and refusal of military service by conscience objectors. See McConnell, supra
note 27, at 1503-11 (reviewing early judicial interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause).
62. According to a 1999 Census Bureau estimate, out of a total population
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immigration laws in the 1960's opened the 'doors to new
immigration from Asia and Africa, creating a dramatic new degree
of ethnic and religious diversity in the United States.' A recent
survey estimates that there are now 3,950,000 Muslims, 401,000
Buddhists and 227,000 Hindus in the United States.' The United
States now has a greater number of religious groups than any
other country.5 This new religious diversity has led to an increase

of 273,866,000, the racial make-up of the United States is as follows:
White (not Hispanic)-196,409 (71.7%)
Black-33,278,000 (12.2%)
Native American-2.033,000 (0.7%)
Asian/Pacific Islander-10,379,000 (3.8%)
Hispanic-31,767,000 (11.6%)
Resident PopulationEstimates of the United States by Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: April 1, 1990 to November 1999 (visited Jan. 10, 2000)

The
<http://www.census.gov/ populations/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt>.
Census Bureau projects sharp increases in the numbers of Asians and other
minority groups by the year 2050. Id. The projections for the year 2050 are as
follows:
White (not Hispanic)-207,901,000 (52.8%)
Black-53,555,000 (13.6%)
Hispanic-96,508,000 (24.5%)
Asian-32,432,000 (8.2%)
Native American-3,534,000 (0.9%)
Resident Population of the United States: Middle Series Projections, 2035 2050, by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, with Median Age (visited Jan. 10,

2000)
www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/nsrh/nprh3550.txt>.

<http:/!
See

Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
2000)
10,
Jan.
(visited
2050
to
1995
Origin:

detailed
(providing
<http://www.census.gov/prod/l/pop/p25-1130/>
explanations of the Census Bureau projections of demographics in the United
States in 2050 and the methods used in making these projections).
63. Laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 had prohibited
immigration from Asia in the 19th Century. Jan C. Ting, How U.S.
Immigration Law Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and
Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 301, 305

(1995). Beginning in the 18th Century, Congress had restricted citizenship by
naturalization to whites only. Id. The Nationality Act of 1940 codified various
laws restricting Asians from U.S. citizenship by naturalization. Id. It was not
until amendment of the 1965 amendment of the Immigration Reform Act of
1952 that barriers to Asian immigration were finally lifted. Id. at 307.
Currently there are approximately 350,000 immigrants from Asia to the
United States per year. Id. at 315 n.42.
64. Barry A. Kosmin and Seymour P. Lachman, National Survey of
1999)
11,
Nov.
(visited
Identity
Religious
<http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html>.
65. Preston Hunter, Largest Religious Groups in the United States of
America (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html>.
See E. ALLEN RICHARDSON, STRANGERS IN THIS LAND: PLURALISM AND THE
RESPONSE TO DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1988) and THE DAWN OF

RELIGIOUS TILURALISM (Richard Seager ed., 1992) for discussions of general

information on religious pluralism in the United States.
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in free exercise-challenges." The new religious diversity has also
increased opportunities for the majority's ignorance of minority
religions to give rise to generally applicable laws infringing on the
free exercise rights of minorities. The following example captures
the essence of the current problem of pluralism and denial of free
exercise rights of religious minorities.
Devinder Kaushal was employed as a banquet server by the
Hyatt Regency of Woodfield, Illinois for ten years.67 Mr. Kaushal
is a devout Hindu who was born and educated in India.'
On
November 21, 1997, Mr. Kaushal was preparing the ballroom for a
banquet by cleaning the room, including mirrors in the room.69
Mr. Kaushal sprayed a swastika on the mirror with cleaning
solution. 0 Mr. Kaushal sprayed a swastika on the mirror because
in Hinduism, and many other religions, the swastika is a symbol of
good luck and prosperity.71 Carol Brown, Mr. Kaushal's supervisor
at the Hyatt, was Jewish and took great offense to seeing a symbol
she associated with Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.72 Hyatt,
unaware of the religious significance of the swastika, fired Mr.
Kaushal for drawing the swastika on the mirror.73
More disturbing than Mr. Kaushal's termination for innocent
and harmless religious conduct is Judge Kocoras' finding that Mr.
Kaushal's religiously motivated drawing of the swastika does not
deserve First Amendment protection.4 Judge Kocoras explained
that the drawing of the swastika is offensive to the sensibilities of
the majority in the United States. 5 As the above case illustrates,
the free exercise rights of religious minorities are especially
subject to burden by the ignorance and indifference of the majority
in the passage and application of laws of general applicability.
66. See Arnold, supra note 55, at 157-58 (citing increasing religious
pluralism and the rise of the regulatory state in the United States as key
factors in the increasing number of free exercise challenges to civil and
criminal laws of general applicability).
67. Kaushal v. Hyatt Regency Woodfield, No. 98 C 4834, 1999 WL 436585,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1999).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The word swastika means "well-being" in Sanskrit, the classical
language of India. M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, A SANSKRIT-ENGLISH DICTIONARY

1283 (1990). It is a solar symbol in Hinduism widely used throughout India
and all of Asia as a symbol of good luck and prosperity. Id.
72. Kaushal, 1999 WL 436585, at *1.
73. Id. at *2. In granting summary judgment for Hyatt in Mr. Kaushal's
Title VII action, the judge relied upon the fact that there was insufficient

evidence that Mr. Kaushal had tried to explain that he was engaging in
religious conduct. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id. Judge Kocoras writes that: "The law does not require indifference to
the sensitivities and feelings of many to accommodate the public religious
fervor of one." Id.
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B. Denying Free Exercise Rights to Asian-Americans under
Employment Division v. Smith and Boerne
Asian-American religious practices come into conflict with
both civil and criminal laws which fail to recognize their conduct
as religiously motivated. One common area for free exercise
challenges is in the application of zoning laws to Asian religious
groups.7" Under the Court's holding in Employment Division v.
Smith and Boerne, zoning laws are often interpreted and enforced
so as to exclude Muslim mosques or Hindu and Buddhist
temples,77 or to place disparate restrictions on the building of such
structures.78 The case of Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of
Hawaii v. Sullivan79 [hereinafter Buddhist Temple] is an example
of such a denial of free exercise rights.
In Buddhist Temple, members of a Korean Buddhist
community in Honolulu were building a new temple in a suburban
neighborhood."0 The group applied for, and was denied, a zoning
variance to allow the temple's ornamental roof to exceed normal
height limitations.8 Although Honolulu's zoning law contained a
statutory exception to the height limitation for church spires,82 the
temple's ornamental roof was found by the Honolulu Zoning
Commission to be not sufficiently "spire like" to receive the
exception.'
Despite evidence that the height of the temple roof was
essential to the traditional structure of such buildings in Korean
Buddhism,' the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that under the
U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Boerne and Employment
Division v. Smith, the court was not able to find a free exercise
violation.'
Religious requirements prescribing personal appearance and
attire is another large area in which members of minority religions
76. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U.

L. REv. 221, 228 (1993). See also R. Gustav Niebuhr, Here is the Church;As for
the People, They're Picketing It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at Al (looking at
efforts to keep Islamic mosques and Buddhist temples from being built in

suburban communities); Chloe Breyer, Religious Liberty in Law and Practice:
Vietnamese Home Temples in California and the First Amendment, 35 J.
CHURCH AND STATE 45 (1993) (examining enforcement of zoning laws to

prevent Vietnamese Buddhists from maintaining small Buddhist shrines in
their homes).
77. Arnold, supra note 55, at 155.

78. Id.
79. 953 P.2d 1315, 1315 (Haw. 1998).
80. Id. at 1319.
81. Id. at 1320. The temple's roof was 6.88 feet higher than the maximum
height allowed under the local zoning ordinance. Id.
82. Id. at 1323.
83. Id.
84. Buddhist Temple, 953 P.2d at 1322.
85. Id. at 1347.
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come into conflict with laws that do not recognize such conduct as
religious. The Sikhs, members of a religion from India with a
large number of adherents in the United States have frequent
problems in this area." Central to Sikh religious practice is the
requirement that they wear five sacred symbols of Sikh identity at
all times: kesh (long hair covered by a turban), kangha (a comb),
kara (a steel bracelet), kachaira (shorts worn under clothing), and
the kirpan (a small knife).87 The requirements to carry a concealed
knife and to wear a turban covering long hair have created
numerous problems for Sikhs in the United States. Such conduct
often brings Sikhs into direct conflict with criminal laws and
workplace safety regulations, because lawmakers never considered
such behavior to be religious conduct deserving exemption.88 The
following case is an example of the problems Sikhs face in
maintaining their religious identity in the United States.
In Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Authority,"9 a Sikh man
challenged his removal from a job with the New York City Transit
Authority for failure to comply with safety policies."° Specifically,
Mr. Kalsi refused to wear a hard-hat that would require him to
either remove or cover his turban, in violation of his religion."'
The wearing of the turban is so essential to Sikh identity that Mr.
Kalsi was willing to lose his job, and engage in lengthy litigation to
preserve his free exercise rights. The judge acknowledged that,
under RFRA and the SherbertlYoder test, Kalsi would have a valid
and probably successful free exercise claim.9" However, relying on
Employment Division v. Smith and Boerne, the judge dismissed

86. Sikhism was founded in northwest India at the beginning of the 16th
century by Guru Nanak as a blend of Hindu and Islamic devotional practices
and beliefs. GERALD JAMES

LARSON, INDIA'S AGONY OVER RELIGION 23 (1995).

Sikhism is monotheistic, and rejects the making of any physical
representations of God. Id. at 24. The Sikh tradition has always been a
minority tradition in India, and the development of Sikhism has always
centered on maintaining a distinct religious and political identity. Id. at 234.
See W. H. MCLEOD, THE SIKHS: HISTORY, RELIGION AND SOCIETY (1989)

(providing a detailed history of the Sikhs struggle to maintain a distinct sociopolitical identity in India).
87. LARSON, supra note 86, at 234.

88. See Cheema v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving
children in California expelled from school for wearing kirpans); State v. Ohio,
690 N.E.2d 917, 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (involving a Sikh man arrested for
carrying a concealed weapon); People v. Singh, 516 N.Y.S.2d 412, 412 (Civ. Ct.

of City of N.Y. 1987) (dismissing case against a Sikh man for carrying a
concealed weapon).
89. No. 94-CV-5757(JG), 1998 WL 903469, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1998).
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id. at *4-5.
92. See id. at * 13 (citing a report which concludes "the chance and potential
severity of head injuries without hard-hats does not warrant the infringement
of protected religious freedoms" under RFRA).
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Mr. Kalsi's free exercise claim.93 The judge held that the denial of
Mr. Kalsi's acknowledged free exercise right was merely the
"incidental effect of an otherwise valid provision."94
The cases of Buddhist Temple and Kalsi, together with the
Yang case discussed earlier," demonstrate the wide range of laws
and regulations which burden the free exercise rights of religious
No state or
The cases illustrate the obvious.
minorities."
municipality in the United States would ever consider outlawing
the display of festive lights and dry evergreen trees because of
their obvious connection with the Christian holiday of Christmas.97
But, as the above cases illustrate, the religious practices of
religious minorities are often suppressed simply because the
majority fails to recognize their conduct as religious and deserving
of free exercise protections. While the Supreme Court's decisions
in Employment Division v. Smith and Boerne allowed this to occur,
the Sherbert/Yoder test vindicates Asian-Americans' free exercise
rights.
C. Protectingthe Free Exercise Rights of Asian-Americans under
Sherbert/Yoder and RFRA
The compelling interest test of SherbertlYoder and RFRA99
provided an effective and just method of protecting the free
The following cases
exercise rights of religious minorities.9
illustrate how courts balance state interests and private rights,
and find a way to preserve the free exercise rights of members of
Asian religions by granting exemptions to laws of general
applicability.
In Islamic Center of Mississippi v. Starkville,'0 a municipality
tried to force an Islamic mosque to move from its location citing
violations of city zoning laws regarding excessive noise and
traffic.'' The court, using the SherbertlYoder test, analyzed the
city's interest in applying the zoning law and the Islamic Center's

93. Id. at *15.
94. Kalsi, 1998 WL 903469 at *15 (citing Employment Division, Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).

95. Id. at*1.
96. See Arnold, supra note 55, at 153 (detailing the wide variety of
regulations challenged under both Employment Division v. Smith and RFRA).
Arnold finds that the free exercise rights of religious minorities are violated at
all levels of the law due to the failure of the majority to consider their conduct
as religious in enacting laws of general applicability. Id.
97.Although the allowance of such decorations contradicts the state interest
in regulating an obvious fire hazard.
98. See supra note 15 (describing the compelling interest test in detail).
99. See Arnold, supra note 55, at 152 (showing that RFRA did not create a
context for excessive free exercise litigation, as many had feared).
100. 840 F.2d 293, 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 296-98.
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free exercise rights. 2 The court found that forcing the mosque to
be built outside the city limits was an unjustified burden on the
plaintiffs free exercise rights.'
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
Barber," the State of New York sought to prevent members of a
Hindu sect from distributing information and soliciting donations
at the New York State Fair.'0 5 The court found that the sect's act
of distributing pamphlets and soliciting funds was religious
conduct deserving First Amendment protection.0 6 The court held
that the state law prohibiting such activity was not justified by a
compelling governmental interest sufficient to warrant the denial
of the sect's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. 7
Finally, in Cheema v. Thompson," a school district expelled
three Sikh children for wearing the ceremonial knives (kirpans)
required by their religion.'
Reviewing the case under RFRA's
mandated use of the SherbertlYoder balancing test, the court
found that the school district placed a substantial burden on the
students' free exercise of religion."0 Balancing this against the
school district's interest in school safety, the court affirmed an
injunction against the school's continued expulsion of the
students."' Because of RFRA, the school was forced to make a
reasonable accommodation for the free exercise rights of the Sikh
children."'
The cases discussed above illustrate how the Sherbert/Yoder
balancing of interests test provided courts with an effective means
of protecting the free exercise rights of members of Asian religions.
The Yang, Buddhist Temple, and Kalsi cases equally illustrate the
unnecessarily harsh results generated under Employment Division

102. Id. at 298-302.
103. Id. at 302. The court held that zoning ordinance was unconstitutional
as applied to the Islamic Center. Id. The city failed to offer a religion-neutral
explanation for their enforcement of the zoning law, and also failed to show
any substantial interest, or less burdensome means, in enforcing the law. Id.
at 302-03.
104. 650 F.2d 430, 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
105. Id. at 432-36.
106. Id. at 441-43.
107. Id. at 444-47.
108. 67 F.3d 883,883 (9th Cir. 1995).
109. See Dipanwita Deb, Of Kirpans, Schools, and the Free Exercise Clause:
Cheema v. Thompson Cuts Through the RFRA's Inadequacies, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 877, 877-86 (1996) (providing the general background and

procedural history of this case). The author also provides detailed information
of the centrality of the kirpan to Sikh religious identity. Id.
110. Id. at 884.
111. Id. at 885-86. The fact that the knives were extremely dull, sewn into
their sheaths, and worn under the children's clothing were key factors in the
decision. Id. at 884-85.
112. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885.
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v. Smith and Boerne.' The conclusion of this comment critiques
the reasoning used by Justice Scalia in nullifying free exercise
exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith and proposes a
reinstatement of the SherbertlYoder test.
III. RE-EXAMINING THE VIABILITY OF THE SHERBERT TEST

Under the Supreme Court's decisions in Employment Division
v. Smith and Boerne, no judicial protection exists for the First
Amendment rights of religious minorities prevented from the free
exercise of their religion by laws of general applicability."" From
what was a settled doctrine of free exercise exemptions, the

113. Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845, 846 (1990); Korean Buddhist Dae
Won Sa Temple of Hawaii v. Sullivan,, 953 P.2d 1315, 1315 (Haw. 1998); Kalsi
v. N.Y. City Transit Authority, No. 94-CV-5757 (JG), 1998 WL 903469, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1998); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
114. But, in an interesting turn, some Federal District and Circuit Courts
have recently refused to extend the Court's holding in Boerne to Federal law.
See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Center, 192 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne did not invalidate
RFRA as applied to Federal law). In another case, bankruptcy debtors
attempted to recover religious tithes from a church as avoidable transactions
in an adversary proceeding. Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141
F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998). The bankruptcy court and the district court
held that the tithes to the church were avoidable transactions, and thus,
recoverable from the church. Id. at 857. The Court of Appeals overruled these
decisions, holding that RFRA is still good law in Federal courts, and that
Boerne invalidated only Congress' power to apply RFRA to local and state
governments under their § 5 enforcement power under the 14th Amendment.
Id. The appellate court found that recovery of the tithes would substantially
burden the debtor's free exercise rights, is not in furtherance of a compelling
government interest, and, therefore, violates the RFRA. Id. This new line of
cases holds that the portion of RFRA applicable to the federal government is
fully severable from the portion applicable to the states, which was invalidated
in Boerne. See also Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 175 n.1 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding that RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal
government); Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional only as applied to the
states); Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
Boerne invalidated only those parts of RFRA applied to state governments).
But see Michael K. Sabers, Well, It Depends on What Your Definition of
"Unconstitutional" is: The Eighth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Flores in
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 44 S.D. L. REv. 432, 458-465
(1999) (stating that Boerne declared RFRA unconstitutional, because it
violated the separation of powers doctrine, as well as the 14th Amendment).
Therefore, all of RFRA is unconstitutional, not just those parts directed at the
states. Id. The author cites with approval the dissent's statement in
Christians that RFRA "impermissibly intruded upon the province of the
Article III branch by imposing upon the courts a standard of review to be
applied in all cases and controversies involving the free exercise of religion."
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 866 (8th Cir.
1998) cited in id. at 464.
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Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith created a state of
chaos and uncertainty in the law."' The case law examined in the
preceding section indicates the injustices resulting from the
Employment Division v. Smith and Boerne decisions, 6 and the fair
and reasonable results reached under SherbertlYoder and RFRA." 7
This section proposes a return to the judicially administered free
exercise exemption set forth in Sherbert and Yoder.
The
effectiveness of the Sherbert test, the inadequacy of the political
process as a protector of First Amendment rights, and the current
state of confusion in the law all demand a return to the compelling
governmental interest test for free exercise exemptions.
A. Options for Free Exercise Rights Following Boerne
The Supreme Court's voiding of free exercise exemptions in
Employment Division v. Smith, and the subsequent invalidation of
RFRA in Boerne, triggered a voluminous scholarly debate on how
best to protect the First Amendment rights of religious minorities
following these decisions. Some scholars propose amendments to
the Constitution specifically guaranteeing the type of exemptions
provided under Sherbert and Yoder."8 This is both impractical and
unnecessary. Impractical because, since 1787, of the over 10,000
constitutional amendments introduced in Congress, only twentyseven have been ratified. 9 Additionally, a "Religious Equality"
Amendment was already introduced by Senator
Orrin Hatch in
20
1995, and failed to gain support in Congress.
115. See supra note 114 for a discussion of the state of the law after
Employment Division v. Smith.
116. See infra Part II. B. for further discussion of the denial of Free Exercise
rights to Asian Americans under Employment Division v. Smith and Boerne.
117. See infra, Part II. C. for further discussion of the protections of Free

Exercise rights which exist under Sherbert/ Yoder and RFRA.
118. See J. Jeffrey Patterson, The Long Road Towards Restoration of
Religious Freedom: CongressionalOptions in Light of City of Boerne v. Flores,
87 KY. L. J. 253, 271 (1998) (proposing a constitutional amendment

incorporating the language and breadth of RFRA as the best way for Congress
to protect the free exercise of religion). Patterson believes that any new
religious liberties legislation enacted by Congress would need to be too

"watered down" to avoid being struck down by the Supreme Court. Id. See
generally Robert P. George, Protecting Religious Liberty in the Next

Millennium: Should We Amend the Religion Clauses of the Constitution?, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 27, 29-49 (1998) (stating that effectuating the original intent
of the Framers may require amending the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment).
119. Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution:
An Economic Analysis of the ConstitutionalAmendment Process, 62 FORDHAM

L. REV. 111, 112 (1993).
120. Patterson, supra note 118, at 273. The text of the proposed amendment
read: "Neither the United States nor any State shall deny benefits to or
otherwise discriminate against any private person or group on account of
religious expression, belief, or identity; nor shall the prohibition on laws
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Other scholars reject the compelling state interest test of
Sherbert altogether and, following Justice Scalia's dicta in
Employment Division v. Smith, 2' propose leaving protection of free
exercise rights to the states.'22 Several states have indeed already
enacted their own "religious freedom" statutes following the
Court's decision in Boerne. 23 The main problem with this
approach is that the state legislature is still left with the freedom
to enact laws that prevent specific forms of religious conduct from
receiving exemptions. More importantly though, is the fact that
the right to freely exercise one's religion is guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution. The primary purpose of the Bill of
Rights is to remove certain freedoms from the political process,
and place those freedoms beyond the reach of politicians." The
Federal government, not the states, has the duty to protect the
freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
This Comment proposes a simple and effective solution to the
current legal and scholarly debates over free exercise exemptions
to laws of general applicability: the Supreme Court must overturn
Employment Division v. Smith and reinstate the Sherbert/Yoder
"compelling governmental interest" test. 125 This test states that
when religious practices are burdened by acts of government, the
government must demonstrate that the burden is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest, which can be achieved in no
less burdensome way." 6 Under this test "only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
M

respecting an establishment of religion be construed to require such
discrimination." S.J. Res. 45, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 121, 104th Cong.
(1995).
121. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
122. See Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions,
4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 591, 597 (1990) (stating that the
compelling state interest test used in free exercise exemption cases leads to
unpredictable results). See also Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465, 1474 (1999) (stating that state

RFRAs providing for judicially-administered free exercise exemptions, subject
to oversight by state legislatures, is the best way to protect First Amendment
rights).
123. Volokh, supra note 122, at 1566 n.6. The language in these statutes
closely follows the language of the Federal RFRA. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN

§

761.03 (West 1999) (stating "[tihe government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion ... [unless] application of the burden to the

person... is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and... is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
124. BETTE NOVIT EvANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION:
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PLURALISM 224 (1997).

125. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 559 (1993) (Souter, J. concurring) (stating that "in a case presenting the
issue, the Court should reexamine the rule [Employment Division v. Smith]

declared").
126. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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legitimate claims to free exercise of religion."... As the following
sections argue, the Court should return to the compelling
governmental interest test in granting free exercise exemptions for
two reasons: 1) the test demonstrated its effectiveness in thirty
years of use prior to the Employment Division v. Smith decision;
and 2) the state legislative process is both an inappropriate and
ineffective forum for the protection of a First Amendment right.
B. Counteringthe Chaos Argument Against Sherbert
In his majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,
Justice Scalia states that the main reason for rejecting the
compelling interest test and the granting of free exercise
exemptions is that "any society adopting such a system would be
courting anarchy.""' The Employment Division v. Smith Court's
rejection of free exercise exemptions is not based on any principle
of Constitutional interpretation such as originalism," 9 but on the
assumption that religious accommodation and free exercise
exemptions threaten government efficiency and social order."'
Justice Scalia presents a "parade of horribles" which would result
from such a rule."' He ignores, however, the obvious fact that in
the cases he cites, courts using the SherbertlYoder test most often
found that a compelling governmental interest outweighed the
individual's claim for a free exercise exemption."'

127. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
128. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). See Toker,
supra note 18, at 288 (stating that Scalia's entire opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith is based on the premise that protecting individuals from
burdens on religious practice would bring the government to a standstill).
Justice Scalia strangely ignores the fact that the Supreme Court authorized
constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions from 1963-1990, and that
"life under the exemption doctrine overruled by the Court was hardly chaotic."
Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV.
671, 688 (1992).

129. Justice Brennan once described this as "arrogance cloaked as humility."
William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986).
130. Toker, supra note 18, at 288.
131. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5. Justice Scalia

envisions any individual who desires it being exempted from drug laws,
paying taxes, serving in the military, child abuse, and environmental laws.
Id. at 888-89.
132. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) at 902. Justice O'Connor notes that the
Court's parade of horribles "not only fails as a reason for discarding the

compelling interest test, it instead demonstrates just the opposite: that courts
have been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state interests." Id.
See Kenneth D. Swansom, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space Between
Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence,77
TEX. L. REV. 753, 761-62 (1999) (exploring how the central concern of the

Employment Division v. Smith decision is the preservation of "ordered
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Two cases
decided using the Sherbert compelling
governmental interest test illustrate the scope of flaw in Justice
Scalia's fear of social anarchy. In People v. Woody, a Native
American was convicted for his sacramental use of peyote in a
religious ritual.'33 The court found that Mr. Woody's free exercise
claim for use of peyote was legitimate, and found that the
government did not have a compelling interest sufficient to justify
depriving Woody of his First Amendment rights. 4 In Leary v.
United States, a defendant in Texas was convicted of possession of
illegal drugs." 5 Like Mr. Woody, Mr. Leary also tried to claim that
he used the drugs for sacramental purposes only, and, therefore,
deserved a free exercise exemption from the applicable drug
laws."' But in this case, the court examined the free exercise
claim and found that it was not legitimate, but a pretense for
7
experimentation with hallucinogenic drugs."1
These two cases
illustrate that courts are indeed capable of administering the
Sherbert test in a reasonable way.
Justice Scalia's "social chaos" justification for the rejection of
the Sherbert test would only make sense if everyone who raised a
free exercise challenge to a law of general applicability was
granted an exemption. As the above cases illustrate, this has
never been the case. A recent comprehensive study of free exercise
challenges to laws of general applicability reinforces this
observation with empirical data. According to the study, of eightyseven cases decided under RFRA and using the Sherbert test, sixty
upheld the regulation over religious exercise. " The study also
found that in only twenty-seven cases were individuals granted an
exemption from the law for their religious practice." 9 Since
Justice Scalia's only major justification for the Employment
Division v. Smith decision was his "anarchy" argument, it seems
clear that there is currently no justification for withholding the
Sherbert test from free exercise jurisprudence.
C. State Legislaturesand the Political Processas
Guarantorsof Religious Freedom
In nullifying the compelling interest test and the concept of
constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions, Justice Scalia
states that the political process is sufficient to insure that religious
activity is not burdened by laws of general applicability. He writes
governance").
133. 394 P.2d 813, 813 (Cal. 1964).
134. Id. at 816-22.
135. 383 F.2d 851, 853-54 (5th Cir. 1967).
136. Id. at 855-58.
137. Id. at 860-70.
138. Arnold, supra note 55, at 152.
139. Id.
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that leaving accommodation of religious practice out of the
political process will place minority religions at a disadvantage,
but that this is an unavoidable consequence of democratic
government. 4 ' This ignores the most common understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause as a protection for religious minorities
from the forces of majoritarian politics."'
The vast majority of free exercise challenges to laws of
general applicability are brought by Muslims, Native Americans,
and members of Caribbean and Asian religions.'42 In fact, not a
single religious exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme
Court from a mainstream Christian religious practitioner.'
This
is because the majority of people in the United States are
Christians, and legislatures express the will of the majority. This
is why what appears to the majority as a "neutral law of general
applicability" is actually benefiting the Christian majority, while
perhaps unwittingly, burdening religious minorities.'"
Religious majorities protect themselves legislatively. The
very point of making the free exercise of religion a Constitutional
right is to protect those whose wills are not reflected by the
majority.45 Under Sherbert and Yoder, the courts provided an
anti-majoritarian counter to the political process that protected
religious minorities.'
The compelling governmental interest test
was not a means of providing religious minorities with special
treatment, but a necessary means of enforcing the First
Amendment to achieve equal respect for the practices of religious
minorities.'47
CONCLUSION
In the Employment Division v. Smith decision, Justice Scalia
140. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
141. EVANS, supra note 124, at 119.
142. Arnold, supra note 55, at 154-55.
143. See Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 195, 216 (1992) (focusing on the inadequacy of the legislative process as a

protector of the Bill of Rights, and arguing for an interpretation of the First
Amendment that recognizes the necessity of free exercise exemptions for the
protection of minority religious groups).

144. The clearest example of this are laws requiring businesses to close on
Sundays while making no exception for Jews, whose religion requires them to
close on Saturdays. See Braunfield v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)
(holding that Orthodox Jewish merchants could not be exempted from a state
law mandating businesses to close on Sunday).

145. EvANs, supra note 124, at 218. The real problem is not blatant
discrimination against religious minorities so much as it is a "selective
indifference" of legislatures to beliefs and practices so incomprehensible to the
majority that they cannot appreciate the impact on the individual of making
their religious conduct criminal. Id.
146. Id. at 226.
147. Id. at 218.
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expressed his beliefs that the Sherbert test would produce
anarchy, and that religious practices of minorities must be
sacrificed to the will of the majority. This Comment demonstrated
that the real chaos has resulted from the abandonment of the
The Supreme Court's resignation of a First
Sherbert test.
Amendment right to the political process is a shameful instance of
the Court's refusal to give the Free Exercise Clause meaning for
an increasingly diverse and religiously plural country. As Justice
Jackson once wrote: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.""

148. W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

